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Abstract
The case studies undertaken in this special issue demonstrate
unequivocally that, despite being forced to operate clandestinely and
facing the pressures of security forces seeking to hunt them down and
neutralize them, at least a subset of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) are
capable of some genuinely impressive feats of engineering. At the same
time, success in such endeavours is not guaranteed and VNSAs will
undoubtedly face a number of obstacles along the way. A comparative
analysis of the cases also reveals new insights about the factors
influencing the decision to pursue complex engineering efforts, the
implementation of such decisions and the determinants of the ultimate
outcome. These result in a set of hypotheses and indicators that, if
confirmed by future research, can contribute to both operational and
strategic intelligence assessments. Overall, the current study enriches
our understanding of how and why VNSAs might engage in complex
engineering efforts.
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Introduction 
Close observers – whether in law enforcement, intelligence agencies or 
academia – of particular terrorist groups and transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs) have long been aware of the technical prowess 
sometimes displayed by their subjects.  Yet, those who study violent non-state 
actors (VNSAs) more broadly, where the relatively straightforward 
application of firearms, explosives and telecommunications are the 
overwhelming norm, can sometimes be misled into viewing these exploits as 
the limit of VNSA capabilities.1  The preceding cases, however, have 
demonstrated unequivocally that, despite being forced to operate 
clandestinely and facing the pressures of security forces seeking to hunt them 
down and neutralize them, at least a subset of VNSAs have shown themselves 
to be capable of some genuinely impressive feats of engineering.  If these 
cases (the basic features of which are shown in Table 1) do nothing more than 
give pause to those who too easily dismiss the potential threats posed by non-
state actors, they will have served a useful purpose. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Case Study Features 
 PIRA 
Aum 
Shinrikyo FARC Zetas HAMAS 
AQ Khan 
Network2 
Complex 
Engineering 
Effort 
Sophisticated 
mortar systems 
Chemical 
weapons; 
Nuclear 
Weapons "Narco-subs" 
Encrypted 
countrywide 
radio network 
Operational 
tunnel network 
into Israel 
Illicit transfer of 
nuclear 
equipment and 
designs 
Overall 
Outcome Successful 
Chemical: 
Limited success; 
Nuclear: 
Unsuccessful Successful Successful Successful Successful 
Type of 
Organization Terrorist Terrorist / Cult 
Terrorist / 
TCO TCO Terrorist 
Smuggling 
network 
General Motive Ethnonationalist 
Apocalyptic-
Millenarian 
Marxist; 
Financial gain Financial gain 
Ethnonationalist; 
Islamist Financial gain 
Regional 
Context Western Europe Asia South America 
North 
America Middle East International 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 For a complete discussion of the literature and theory surrounding complex engineering 
efforts by VNSAs, as well as the methodology and case selection process, see the 
Introduction to this Special Issue. 
2 As described in the Introduction to the Special Issue, the AQ Khan network is presented 
not as a case of complex engineering itself, but rather as an example of how an illicit 
network might facilitate and support such an effort. It is therefore analyzed separately 
from the other cases for most purposes in this analysis and is differentiated from the 
other cases in the table with italics. 
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Decision 
Still, the case studies have a lot more to offer in terms of providing insights 
into the characteristics that are associated with VNSA complex engineering 
efforts.  Beginning with the decision to engage in complex engineering efforts, 
Table 2 below summarizes several aspects of the decision making process 
across the case studies (the A.Q. Khan nuclear case will be discussed 
separately).  For the general context in which decisions were made, in all 
cases the actual decision to engage in the complex engineering effort was 
made by the central decision-making body in each organization.  Irrespective 
of who actually carried out the effort, in all cases the organization’s senior 
leadership had to at least give the go-ahead.  While there might have been 
consultation with and input from lower level organizational personnel, it 
appears that since the effort under consideration represented a major new 
initiative, requiring the investment of substantial organizational resources 
and often entailing sizeable risks, it was not left up to functional entities or 
field commanders to make the key decisions, which occurred in a top-down 
fashion.  
 
Another common feature across all the cases was the high risk tolerance 
displayed by the organization’s decision makers more generally.  While the 
small number of cases and the absence of negative examples make it difficult 
to state that a high tolerance for risk is either necessary or sufficient for 
deciding to engage in a complex engineering effort, it is striking that none of 
the VNSAs studied could be characterized as being operationally conservative 
in any way.  Moreover, a perceived urgency to act did not seem to color most 
of the VNSA decision making.  While leaders may have perceived a clear 
strategic need to do something different, in no case (with the exception of 
Aum Shinrikyo, which had a prophesized deadline only a few years hence) 
was there evidence that the leaders felt the need to make the decision quickly 
or rashly.  Embarking on a complex engineering effort was therefore mostly a 
reasoned decision, one that likely estimated the various costs and benefits 
involved. 
 
Turning to the key question of what factors contributed to the decisions 
themselves, while the specifics vary considerably across the VNSAs studied, 
there are several commonalities in the overall motivational formula.  This can 
be discerned by viewing the interacting effects of different levels of motivation 
that underlie the decision to engage in a complex engineering effort.  Across 
the cases, (1) the basic motivational disposition of the VNSA itself exerts the 
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broadest stimulus by determining more proximate strategic goals.  It is these 
goals that (2) in turn produce the tactical requirements that (3), often in 
reaction to external circumstances, then provide the impetus for the 
organization to make a change in its operations.  Lastly, it appears that (4) a 
variety of contingent and contextual factors influence the selection of a 
particular solution to the operational problem that involves a complex 
technology, as well as the decision to engage in an internal engineering effort 
to obtain this technology.  For example, in the case of the PIRA, their 
fundamentally ethnonationalist conflict against the British pushed them to 
attack police and military targets, which in turn sparked a search to tactically 
overcome the high-walled fortifications surrounding these targets, while 
several contextual factors, including particular tactical requirements in an 
urban environment and a distrust of externally sourced armaments, led them 
to pursue their own mortar systems.  Similarly, the FARC, which had evolved 
to pursue financial gain, was driven to make operational changes by increased 
interdiction rates by counternarcotics authorities, while the advantages in 
terms of carrying capacity and detection avoidance, together with a high 
return on investment, prompted the decision to pursue a submersible 
development program. 
 
Table 2: Decision Characteristics 
 PIRA Aum Shinrikyo FARC Zetas HAMAS 
Decision 
Makers Army Council 
Shoko Asahara 
(leader) 
General Secretariat 
and Joint Western 
Command 
Heriberto Lazcano-
Lazcano (with 
Antonio Cardenas-
Guillen, 
JorgeCostilla-
Sanchez) 
Al-Qassam Brigades 
(esp. Mohammed 
Deif) 
Decision 
Process 
Mainly top-down, 
centralized for 
mortars (with some 
bottom-up input) 
Extremely top-
down, centralized 
Top-down (with 
some bottom-up 
input from 
individual fronts) Top-down Top-down 
General Risk 
Tolerance High Very High High High High 
Perceived 
Urgency Moderate High Low Low Low 
Motivation for 
Change 
Destroy fortified 
targets 
Overthrow 
Japanese 
government and 
initiate doomsday; 
leader's fetish-like 
affinity for 
unconventional 
weapons 
Counteract 
improved detection 
/ interdiction 
efforts by 
authorities 
Better operational 
coordination and 
intelligence 
gathering than 
rivals 
To address military 
imbalance 
asymmetrically and 
penetrate defenses 
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Key Drivers of 
Internal 
Development 
of Specific CE 
(1) Specific tactical 
requirements not 
met by available 
products (other 
weapons or military 
mortars) 
(2) External sources 
largely unavailable 
(3) Distrust of 
externally sourced 
material  
(4) DIY prestige 
(5) Confidence in 
technical prowess 
(6) Allowed for 
tactical/strategic 
evolution 
(1) Failure to 
procure weapons 
from external 
sources 
(2) Copious 
financial resources 
(3) Confidence in 
leader's prophecies 
(1) Tactical 
advantages over 
alternatives in 
terms of avoiding 
detection 
(2) High return on 
investment 
(3) Resale / rental 
opportunities 
(1) Existing 
infrastructure 
inadequate for its 
needs 
(2) Military 
background of 
leaders (desire for 
efficiency and 
precision) 
(3) Possessed 
sufficient resources 
(cost tens of 
millions of dollars) 
(4) Prestige 
(messaging to 
rivals; government) 
(1) Prior experience 
in building tunnels 
(2) Covert 
penetration of 
Israel 
(3) Provide 
protection 
(weapons storage 
and leadership) 
(4) Provide (busy) 
work for Hamas 
members and boost 
morale 
(5) Limited tactical 
support from state 
sponsors 
Long-Term 
Investment in 
CE Yes 
Chemical: 
Somewhat; Nuclear: 
No Yes Yes Yes 
 
One salient motivational factor to note is that in every case studied, the desire 
on the part of the VNSA to alter its operational posture was prompted by 
some change in the VNSA’s strategic or tactical environment, whether it is an 
electoral loss (as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo), or the persistence of multiple 
rivals in illicit markets (as in the case of the Zetas).  It can thus be 
hypothesized that complex engineering efforts by VNSAs are much less likely 
to arise spontaneously where an organization perceives itself to be enjoying 
tactical and strategic success in terms of reaching its immediate goals. 
 
A second hypothesis suggested by the cases is that a complex engineering task 
is more likely to be undertaken in the absence of any simple alternatives that 
will solve the operational problem that the VNSA is confronted with.  This 
accords with the general theory that VNSAs tend to be conservative and 
imitative in their operations and will in most instances pursue the path of 
least resistance.  A corollary to the hypothesis is that a complex technology 
will usually be sought only if there exists no simple technology that will suffice 
and that a VNSA will usually decide to engage in an internal engineering 
effort to acquire the technology only if no external suppliers are readily 
available or if external supply poses too many security risks. 
 
It also appears that, even though the VNSAs studied were willing to take large 
risks, they did not undertake complex engineering projects on the off chance 
that they might be successful.  In all the cases studied, leaders seem to have 
made the final decision to embark on such an effort only if they had at least 
some degree of confidence in their groups’ ability to pull it off.  Whether the 
source of this confidence lay in having copious resources, professional cadre, 
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prior experience in similar technical areas, or even a delusional faith in 
prophecy (as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo), the decision was made based on 
some expectation of success, at least in the long run.  Another hypothesis is 
therefore that a positive decision to pursue a complex engineering effort will 
be far more likely if factors can be identified that might boost leaders’ 
confidence in their efforts’ ultimate success. 
 
In at least two of the cases (the PIRA and Los Zetas), the desire for prestige 
likely played some role in the decision.  Here, the very act of the VNSA 
undertaking a complex, risky and resource-intensive effort might have been 
perceived as valuable in terms of messaging to opponents, rivals or followers 
that the organization was one to be reckoned with.  While likely neither to be 
a necessary nor sufficient criterion, it can thus be hypothesized that where an 
organization is especially concerned with its image as a sophisticated, 
innovative actor, a desire for prestige can be a powerful facilitating factor in 
the decision to engage in a complex engineering effort. 
 
The case studies support many of the broader findings and theories of how 
and when VNSAs decide to innovate, as outlined in the introductory article. 
Several of the drivers of innovation mentioned in the literature, such as 
countermeasures by security forces and a greater desire for status, are 
reflected in the cases.  So is causal variation in the decision making, although 
the cases of complex engineering efforts presented in this volume point 
towards a more generalizable decision framework (as described above) than is 
discernible in the broader VNSA innovation context.  The importance placed 
in the literature on a willingness to take risks and organizational learning is 
also echoed by the case studies.  Another factor is the facilitative effect of 
internal champions, which is alluded to in several of the cases. However, 
because the champions in the cases tended to coincide with the senior 
leadership of the VNSAs, it is not possible to identify an independent effect of 
internal or external champions.  
 
Factors identified in the literature on VNSA innovation that were not 
supported (but also not contradicted) by the majority of the case studies were: 
The effects of demonstration of the technology by other VNSAs3 on the 
decision to pursue a complex engineering efforts (since most of the complex 
engineering efforts had never been undertaken by VNSAs previously), 
whether a self-sustaining momentum developed that would have continued to 
drive the efforts even in the absence of the initial stimuli, and the extent to 
                                                          
3 The Hamas case did reflect this factor, however, in that its ally Hezbollah as well as its 
rival Fatah had previously constructed tunnels. 
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which the possession of institutionalized R&D organs or safe havens 
contributed towards the decision to engage in these efforts.  However, related 
to this last area, possessing high levels of resources seem to be particularly 
important in the context of the decision to proceed with a complex 
engineering effort, which would not necessarily be the case with broader 
VNSA innovation.  Given the selection of case studies of only positive 
decisions to pursue, several findings in the literature, such as the 
disincentives for innovating in the presence of internal discord or high 
pressures from security forces, could not be explored in the current study. 
 
Implementation  
The case studies make perhaps their greatest contribution with respect to 
exploring the implementation of complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, given 
that there is scant existing literature on this topic.  Table 3 summarizes the 
implementation aspects examined across the five relevant cases.  First, from 
the time frames over which implementation occurred, it is immediately 
apparent that complex engineering tasks are not generally implemented very 
quickly, at least not to the extent that they return results that can be regarded 
as unqualified successes.  It appears to take a minimum of several years’ 
worth of effort to yield even modestly successful outcomes (as in the cases of 
Aum’s chemical weapons), and can take upwards of a decade or more to 
achieve the fully-realized outcomes initially envisaged by group leaders (as in 
the cases of PIRA mortars and FARC “narco-submarines”).  It can thus be 
hypothesized that complex engineering efforts by VNSAs take a considerable 
amount of time, at least relative to the highly dynamic environment within 
which most VNSAs operate.  If confirmed, this would suggest that law 
enforcement, intelligence and military agencies have a sizeable window in 
which to detect and interdict such efforts. 
 
Table 3: Implementation Characteristics 
 PIRA Aum Shinrikyo FARC Zetas HAMAS 
Time Frame 1970-1990s 
Chemical: 1990-1995; 
Nuclear: 1992-1993 1992-present 2006-2012 
Circa 2007-
present 
Location 
Various in Republic 
of Ireland; also N. 
Ireland and maybe 
England 
Various facilities in 
Japan and farm in 
Australia 
Sanquianga and 
Buenaventura 
Regions, Colombia 
Majority of Mexico's 
31 states Gaza 
Primary 
Implementer  
Engineering 
Department 
"Ministry of 
Construction"; 
"Ministry of Science 
and Technology" 
Joint Western 
Command 
Technical team (~20 
people) led by Jose 
Estrada; assisted by 
local plaza bosses 
Al-Qassam 
Brigades 
Engineering Unit 
(direction by M. 
Deif, A. al-Jaabari) 
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Technical 
Expertise 
Needed 
Explosives; 
machining; 
propulsion / 
aerodynamics 
Chemical 
engineering; nuclear 
physics; metallurgy; 
mechanical 
engineering 
Technical design and 
construction (e.g., 
engineers, welders, 
electricians, fiberglass 
installers); experts in 
navigation 
equipment; 
experienced seafarers 
Telecommunications 
engineers; hardware 
/ software expertise. 
Geology; structural 
engineering; 
electrical 
engineering; 
mining 
Key Source of 
Expertise 
Professionally-
trained members 
(incl. engineers); 
military manuals & 
personnel; trial and 
error 
Recruitment of 
professionally-
trained members; 
outside consultants; 
the Internet 
Professionally-
trained members; 
Colombian navy 
personnel; 
subcontractors 
(Russian, Sri Lankan, 
Pakistani engineers); 
coerced naval 
engineers 
Initially, hiring 
technicians; later, 
kidnapping and 
coercion 
Prior experience 
with smuggling 
tunnels; assistance 
from Hezbollah 
(perhaps indirectly 
Iran and N. Korea) 
Key Source of 
Materials / 
Equipment 
Legitimate 
purchase; state 
sponsor (Libya) 
Legitimate purchase 
through front 
companies 
Legitimate purchase 
(?) 
Legitimate purchase 
by plaza bosses 
Illegitimate 
(Egyptian 
smuggling tunnels) 
and legitimate 
purchase 
Collaboration 
Limited (high 
explosives from 
Libya) 
Networks of scientists 
and officials in 
Russia, US and 
elsewhere, often 
accessed through 
front companies 
Limited (individual 
subcontractors) 
Gulf Cartel (for  a 
time) 
Hezbollah; Iran; 
Gulf states 
Concern with 
Safety 
Less concern early 
period; more 
concern later 
(moderate overall) High Low Low 
Unknown (likely 
moderate) 
Concern with 
Security 
Low in Rep. of 
Ireland; High in 
Northern Ireland 
and elsewhere Moderate High Moderate High 
Obstacles 
Encountered 
Accuracy; safety; 
detonation 
reliability 
Lack of access to 
nuclear materials; 
design flaws in 
chemical production 
and delivery Design flaws 
Government 
counter-operations; 
difficult terrain 
Detection of 
building activities; 
maintenance 
requirements 
Response to 
Obstacles 
Perseverance; 
technical 
improvements 
Switch from nuclear 
back to chemical (and 
biological); increased 
resource investment 
to correct design 
flaws 
Perseverance; 
technical 
improvements from 
new expertise 
Perseverance - 
replaced seized / 
destroyed 
equipment; 
expanded 
infrastructure in 
rural areas 
Perseverance; 
more 
inconspicuous 
methods (e.g., 
digging by hand); 
devoted extensive 
resources to 
maintenance 
 
 
Second, and acting to some extent in a countervailing fashion to the previous 
point about windows of opportunity for law enforcement and intelligence, 
across all of the cases the complex engineering efforts studied took place in 
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locations wherein the VNSAs could operate in relative security, with a good 
chance of remaining unmolested.  The PIRA enjoyed some degree of 
sanctuary in the Republic of Ireland while developing their mortars; Aum 
Shinrikyo was protected by the Japanese government’s reticence to scrutinize 
religious movements and the isolation of their Australian property; FARC 
conducted its “narco-sub” operations in inaccessible jungle areas; the Zetas 
enjoyed near impunity in many regions of Mexico where corruption had 
infested civil society; and Hamas controlled the territory of Gaza when it built 
its operational tunnels.  The existence of VNSA safe havens can therefore be 
hypothesized to complicate counterterrorist or counter-criminal attempts to 
detect or interrupt complex engineering efforts. 
 
Third, in terms of who within the VNSA is tasked with implementing the 
complex engineering effort, in almost all the cases the responsibility was 
given to a specialist technical or logistical organ in the group, whether this 
was institutionalized (as in the cases of the PIRA, Hamas, and Aum 
Shinrikyo) on a broader scale in the organizational structure or more ad-hoc 
(as in the cases of FARC and the Zetas).  Complex engineering efforts by their 
very nature are highly technical and will almost always represent a radical 
departure from standard operating procedures within the VNSA. This accords 
with the more general theory that dedicated, separate R&D organs can bolster 
the chances of success when VNSAs choose to innovate; indeed, in the context 
of complex engineering efforts, this might be more of a requirement than a 
facilitating factor.  The existence of a well-resourced, specialized entity 
endorsed by the leadership might thus be a necessary precondition for any 
serious attempt to realize a complex engineering effort, which in turn might 
provide specific, moderately diagnostic indicators4 for intelligence analysts 
observing the VNSA. 
 
Fourth, with respect to the types of expertise needed, these vary considerably 
across cases, although—as is to be expected—various types of engineering 
(including electrical, aeronautical, chemical, structural and mechanical) 
feature prominently.  Much of the required expertise appears to have come 
from professionals who had been previously trained, whether this could be 
found among existing members (as in the PIRA and Hamas cases), members 
specially recruited for their expertise (as in the case of Aum), hired 
consultants (in the case of FARC), external actors lending assistance (Hamas), 
or even coerced technicians (in the cases of FARC and Los Zetas).  While there 
was also some internal development of expertise, for example by sending 
                                                          
4 Heuer, Richards, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Langley, VA: Center for the Study 
of Intelligence, 1999). 
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members for professional training (PIRA) or a process of trial and error 
(PIRA and Hamas), it can be hypothesized that in most cases VNSA complex 
engineering efforts will involve some degree of externally-sourced 
professional expertise, at least if the organization is keen on keeping the 
length of the development cycle to a minimum.  Thus, contrary to the 
literature on general VNSA innovation, professional technical expertise, 
beyond a generally proficient and stable membership, might be necessary.  If 
confirmed, this can provide opportunities for detection of complex 
engineering activities by VNSAs. 
 
Conversely, when it comes to the source of needed materials, in almost every 
case at least a significant portion of these materials were purchased from 
commercial suppliers, albeit often under the pretext of legitimate commerce, 
e.g., through front companies.  While there was some assistance from state 
sponsors (in the case of Hamas and the PIRA), and some acquisition from 
illicit networks, in none of the cases studied was there outright theft to obtain 
materials, which would have provided a useful indicator of activity.  If the 
reliance on legitimate purchase for materials applies more broadly than the 
cases studied, this potentially makes it more difficult for intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies to detect most complex engineering efforts through 
material acquisition activities, unlike the case with, say small arms, explosives 
and nuclear materials acquisition. 
 
Fifth, although many of the cases involved at least some collaboration with 
outside entities, except for the professional expertise provided from outside 
(which generally occurred on an individual basis), it appears as if 
collaboration with outside actors, such as states or other VNSAs was not 
entirely necessary.  For example, Libya provided the PIRA with high 
explosives, which certainly assisted in their production of mortars, but even 
before this, the PIRA had succeeded in creating operational mortars using 
home-made explosives.  Similarly, while Hezbollah may have assisted Hamas 
in designing attack tunnels, Hamas had decades of internal Palestinian 
experience with smuggling tunnels to draw upon. 
 
Sixth, organizational concern with the safety of general VNSA members 
involved in complex engineering efforts is variable across the cases, although 
it is interesting to note that the only group which unequivocally paid careful 
attention to its members’ safety was Aum Shinrikyo, which was also arguably 
the least successful of the cases studied in terms of its complex engineering 
endeavors.  This does not necessarily contradict the assertion in the literature 
that key members with technical skills and experience will be protected, since 
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the cases mostly do not reveal how the safety of these key implementers was 
regarded within the organization.  In the related matter of how much 
operational security VNSAs employed during their complex engineering 
efforts, this was generally moderate to high, with the key determinant 
apparently the degree to which the organization believed itself to be 
vulnerable to security forces. 
 
The last aspect of implementation and a particularly important one involves 
the obstacles experienced during the process and how the VNSAs responded 
to these obstacles.  It is immediately apparent from the cases that, as 
expected, almost any endeavor undertaken by a VNSA that qualifies as a 
complex engineering effort is almost certain to face at least some obstacles 
along the path from conception to execution.  One assumption, which spans 
the relevant literature and which applies to all of the obstacles discussed 
below, is that as the complex engineering task in question becomes more 
complex and more technically demanding, the potential obstacles become 
greater in number and severity.  While the case studies do not confirm this 
assumption as such, they certainly do not contradict it either.  In every case 
studied, the VNSA under consideration experienced at least one (and often 
more) serious impediments to success.  These ranged from defects in design 
(e.g., PIRA and FARC), lack of access to materials (Aum Shinrikyo), operating 
in difficult terrain (Los Zetas) and having to avoid government forces during 
implementation (Los Zetas and Hamas).  
  
However, in the case of all but Aum, a common thread amongst the various 
responses was perseverance in the effort despite setbacks.  It was only in the 
Aum Shinrikyo case of nuclear weapons where the group abandoned their 
plans and switched back to chemical and biological agents; it might not be 
coincidental that this is the organization that ultimately enjoyed possibly the 
least success from a purely engineering point of view.  Besides perseverance, 
the VNSAs employed a variety of means to overcome obstacles, including 
making iterative technical improvements, bringing on additional expertise, 
replacing infrastructure lost to security force activity and increasing their 
resource investment in the project.  Each of these, however, can be seen as an 
adaptation to an internal or external impediment.  It can be hypothesized that 
VNSAs that possess sufficient fortitude to persevere in the face of setbacks 
and that have the capacity to devote additional resources (including 
personnel, equipment, and funding) to a complex engineering effort are far 
more likely to succeed in the face of almost inevitable obstacles.  Conversely, 
those VNSAs who lack suitable depth in motivation and capability are 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/10
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1511
129 
 
hypothesized to be far less likely to succeed in complex engineering efforts in 
general. 
 
Outcome 
Most of the cases studied (with the notable exception of Aum’s nuclear 
program) represent successful attempts by VNSAs to engage in complex 
engineering efforts.  Table 4 encapsulates the major factors identified in each 
case study as being primarily responsible for the outcome of the complex 
engineering effort.  The VNSAs under examination pursued very different 
types of technology as part of these efforts.  Yet, while each case had some 
unique determinants of success, from the cases as a whole we can identify 
four key elements that in general might be expected to increase the 
probability of a VNSA being successful in a complex engineering endeavor.  
 
Table 4: Outcome Summary 
Case Outcome Main Determinants of Outcome 
PIRA Success 
(a) Organizational and individual expertise and access to materials 
(b) Safe haven 
(c) Culture of learning 
Aum 
Chemical: 
Limited 
Success 
Nuclear: 
Failure 
Chemical: 
(a) High resources 
(b) Safe haven (protected as a religion under Japanese law) 
(c) Technical personnel, but insufficiently skilled 
Nuclear: 
(a) Self-imposed ideological deadline 
(b) Lack of physics knowledge and practical expertise in nuclear engineering 
FARC Success 
(a) Financial and human resources 
(b) Safe havens (inaccessible areas) 
(c) Culture of learning / long-term strategy 
(d) Influence over populace 
Zetas Success 
(a) High resources 
(b) Ruthless efficiency and esprit d'corps 
HAMAS Success 
(a) High resource investment 
(b) Prior experience with smuggling tunnels 
(c) Culture of Learning 
AQ 
Khan 
Network 
Success (in 
terms of 
smuggling) 
(a) Unfamiliar environment for intelligence agencies 
(b) Concealment activities 
(c) Venal suppliers 
(d) Lack of political will to prevent activities 
  
1. Substantial investment of resources. The very nature of complex 
engineering efforts means that they will invariably require significant 
amounts of both human and financial resources to undertake.  This is 
especially true when one considers the inevitable obstacles that will 
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arise during any attempt to operationalize a new, complex process.  
Not only must a VNSA possess (or be able to acquire) high levels of 
resources, but it must be both willing and able to devote these 
resources to the complex engineering effort, most likely maintaining 
these levels over an extended period of time as the development 
process matures.  In at least four of the five case studies of complex 
engineering efforts (Aum Shinrikyo, Los Zetas, FARC and Hamas), the 
VNSAs possessed large amounts of fungible resources that could be 
applied to the complex engineering effort without detracting 
significantly from other activities, and even in the case of the PIRA, the 
leadership was willing to devote a non-negligible proportion of its 
resources to mortar development for more than two decades.  A 
corollary to this hypothesis is that a long-term commitment is needed 
for most complex engineering efforts to succeed. 
 
2. Technical Expertise. As in the more general case of innovation by 
VNSAs, the transfer or development of the required technical 
knowledge and practical skills played a central role in determining 
outcomes in the case studies.5  Whether by bringing in outside 
expertise (e.g., FARC and Los Zetas) or developing their own through 
trial-and-error (e.g., PIRA and Hamas), it is hypothesized that a VNSA 
complex engineering effort is unlikely to succeed without acquiring the 
appropriate amount of technical expertise for the effort at hand. In 
most respects, there is no place for amateurs in complex engineering 
efforts. The Aum Shinrikyo case exemplifies this—in the domain in 
which the group possessed expertise, namely chemical engineering, it 
was more successful, while in those areas where this expertise was 
lacking, namely nuclear physics and nuclear engineering, it  failed 
miserably, despite the devotion of substantial resources and efforts in 
that direction. 
 
                                                          
5 A more nuanced approach to this topic is to focus separately on the different knowledge 
components embodied in technical skills. These can be separated into what Michael 
Kenney characterizes as general technical knowledge (techne) and contextual, 
experiential knowledge (mētis), both of which are argued to be crucial to successful 
adoption of new technology. Kenney, Michael, “ ‘Dumb’ Yet Deadly: Local Knowledge and 
Poor Tradecraft Among Islamist Militants in Britain and Spain,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 33:10 (2010), 911-932; Ackerman, Gary, “‘More Bang for the Buck’: 
Examining the Determinants of Terrorist Adoption of New Weapons Technologies” (PhD 
Dissertation: King’s College London, 2014), 23, available at: 
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/32901277/2014_Ackerman_Gary_0715371_ethes
is.pdf, 87-90. 
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3. Safe haven. As noted above, one feature shared by nearly all of the 
VNSAs studied was that they were able to pursue their complex 
engineering efforts over extended periods in circumstances where 
direct engagement with security forces was unlikely.  They were able to 
engage in R&D in a relatively secure environment with relatively little 
operational risk.  A plausible hypothesis is thus that some measure of 
safe haven is necessary for most VNSAs’ complex engineering efforts 
to succeed. 
 
4. Culture of learning. The last factor that seems to have played an 
important role in more than one case is the ability of the VNSA to 
identify the source of deficiencies in its efforts, and then to persevere 
until a solution to the problem is found and executed.  This ties into 
the investment of resources in that it implies commitment to the effort 
over an extended period of time.  
 
It is at this stage that reference to the A.Q. Khan case study can be made. The 
relevance of this case lies in how it demonstrates that VNSAs need not depend 
on state actors for even the most highly technical and difficult to obtain 
components and expertise required for complex engineering efforts.  Driven 
by the opportunity for financial gain, A.Q. Khan stood at the head of an illicit 
non-state actor network that persisted for over fifteen years and spanned 
more than twenty countries around the world.  Although the Khan network 
was provided with some cover by the Pakistani state, even when this 
diminished, the network endured despite extensive nonproliferation efforts 
by the major powers following the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. 
Two of the main reasons for the continued success of A.Q. Khan in providing 
nuclear equipment and expertise to a variety of customers (fortunately, none 
of them non-state actors) were the willingness of legitimate suppliers to look 
the other way in exchange for increased profit and the ability of the network 
to move further up the supply chain to obtain more basic components that 
were not controlled.  Nor was the Khan case an anomaly.  While it illustrates 
that an illicit trading network could exist for even the most dangerous and 
sophisticated technology, there are many other instances of non-state actor 
networks supplying dangerous materials for profit, including the long-
standing arms smuggling networks of Viktor Bout and Monzer Al-Kasser and 
the biological agent exploits of Wouter Basson, the former head of the South 
African chemical and biological weapons programs, who also “went rogue” 
while enjoying the tacit protection of the state. 
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Future Research Directions and Policy Implications 
The case studies have provided several insights into the decision, 
implementation and outcomes of complex engineering efforts as undertaken 
by VNSAs. The observation that we are able to discern several common 
elements—from similar decisional underpinnings to factors that facilitate 
implementation—across very different cases reflecting different time periods, 
geographic regions and motivations, indicates that VNSA complex 
engineering efforts might be shaped by similar dynamics and subject to a 
particular set of constraints.  However, as noted in the introductory article to 
the special issue, the case studies represent only an exploratory investigation 
into the phenomenon.  Although several hypotheses are suggested by the 
cases, these hypotheses require confirmation through more robust testing 
procedures before they can be fully utilized to shape policy and practice. In 
addition to identifying and investigating additional cases of successful 
complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, it will be necessary to explore multiple 
instances of failed attempts to engage in complex engineering.  This would 
enable the use of several qualitative and quantitative methods, such as case-
control sampling and Qualitative Comparative Analysis,6 to determine the 
extent to which any of the hypothesized factors are necessary, sufficient or 
merely strongly correlated with particular outcomes and indicators. 
 
With respect to how this study can help to inform counterterrorist and law 
enforcement policy and practice, if the above hypotheses are indeed 
confirmed by further investigation, many of them can be directly employed as 
observable indicators to show when a VNSA has the intent to engage in, or is 
already engaging in, complex engineering efforts.  This would be useful for 
intelligence analysis at the operational level.  For example, among the 
potential indicators that might prove most useful in detecting and interdicting 
VNSA complex engineering efforts are: (1) Changes in a VNSA’s strategic or 
tactical environment for which no simple operational adaptation will 
compensate and where there are no readily available suppliers of the 
necessary technology; or (2) Attempts by a VNSA to recruit, hire, coerce or 
otherwise acquire technical expertise.  
 
The factors that point to an increased (or decreased) likelihood of a VNSA 
engaging in, and especially succeeding in, complex engineering efforts can 
                                                          
6 For example, see Stolley, Paul and James Schlesselman, Case-control studies: Design, 
Conduct, Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) and Rihoux, Benoȋt, and 
Charles Ragin (eds.), Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 
2009). 
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also inform strategic threat assessments, both of particular VNSAs and of 
classes of VNSAs such as transnational criminal organizations.  Therefore, 
further research might confirm that the VNSAs that are most likely to pursue 
and succeed in complex engineering efforts are those which: (1) have a 
penchant for taking risks; (2) are willing and able to devote substantial 
resources to the effort for an extended period of time; (3) can conduct R&D 
through a specialized organ in a location of relative security; (4) tend to 
persevere in the face of setbacks; and (5) either already have, or can relatively 
easily acquire, the necessary expertise. 
 
Overall, the current study has enriched our understanding of how and why 
VNSAs might engage in complex engineering efforts.  It has shown that such 
endeavors will undoubtedly face a number of obstacles and requirements and 
thus hardly constitute faits accompli.  Nonetheless, we must not 
underestimate the ability of VNSAs to accomplish remarkable feats of 
engineering in pursuit of their tactical and strategic goals.  When 
organizational conditions are right, almost any technical task, even the most 
complex, become feasible for VNSAs. 
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